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Involving in and Depicting Science: SF’s Ambivalent 
Effect	

Science fiction (SF), in any of its artistic representations, serves as 
an excellent platform to make science more appealing and accessible to 
the general public. It can be a very valuable didactic tool, but it also 
often foresees many scientific developments that eventually become 
part of our everyday lives. This visionary quality has also led to new 
disciplines within the scientific professions, such as SF Prototyping 
(SFP), applied to envision future development possibilities for 
engineering, medical or business technologies. But perhaps the most 
outstanding contribution of the genre is its ability to arouse critical 
thinking about our own nature and the way we relate to the issues that 
most dramatically shape human experience, which often include 
scientific discourse and practice. This is a double-edged sword, since 
the messages conveyed through fiction can sometimes result in 
popular misconceptions which in turn may affect scientific research 
and performance and, consequently, society. In our days, biomedical 
science is probably the most fertile ground to explore this ambivalent 
mechanism, both for its abundance in fiction and for the crucial ethical 
debates it ignites in our society, an obviously interrelated binomial. A 
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decade ago Joan Slonezewski and Michael Levy (2003: 175) already 
acknowledged «Genetic engineering» and «Sexuality and 
reproduction» as two of the five most enduring themes in 20thC SF. 
The dangers of genetic manipulation seem to have, in fact, displaced 
those of nuclear power in the shaping of a common suspicion of 
science which reached its zenith after the Second World War. Two 
illustrative examples of this shift, as Craig Cormick (2006: 182) has 
pointed out, are the remakes of Spiderman (Dir. Sam Raimi, USA, 2002) 
and Hulk (Dir. Ang Lee, USA, 2003): in both cases the superheroes' 
powers, hitherto derived from nuclear radiation, now come as the 
consequence of genetic alteration. !
A popular character in SF narrative is "the mad scientist"- driven 
by blind ambition for knowledge and accomplishment to a god-like 
level-, a figure that particularly stands out in the biomedical subgenre. 
But this stereotype, built upon a long tradition of literary and 
cinematographic icons (e. g. Dr. Faustus, Victor Frankenstein or C. A. 
Rotwang) is not the only agent to blame for science's depiction as 
perverse: corporate greed and governmental control also take part in 
such portrayal. All of these powers are the ones actually operating 
behind the misuse of science; a misuse which, ironically, is not 
perceived as such. Blame falls on the tool, not the user. This blurring of 
responsibilities contributes to an established paradigm: that science is 
uncontrollable per se. People cannot have control over science or 
scientists; they escape law and ethics and might even be unable to 
predict or repair the catastrophic consequences of their acts. Altering 
the natural order of things is unavoidably and intrinsically wrong, a 
discourse that prevailed in the depiction of nuclear power and that has 
now, as we have mentioned, naturally been assimilated by biomedical 
praxis. !
Narratives that have genetic engineering or cloning as a structural 
axis usually follow a more or less typified pattern: the aforementioned 
techniques favour some members of the community and displace 
others who are left out to different degrees. This is generally 
accomplished through the fabrication of a lie or an alternate reality in 
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which information is deliberately kept from the beneficiaries, the 
victims, or both. The "less-than-human" status conferred to the clones 
or the genetically inferior reflects the inhumanity of the scientific agent 
that has brought them to this alienation and abuse. It is these 
victimised characters who denounce the illegal/immoral practice to 
their society and/or to the audience. Although the main question in 
these works of fiction is precisely what it means to be human and who 
can be catalogued as such, this is often accompanied by the sometimes 
hidden message that cloning and genetic engineering can only result in 
disastrous and immoral situations. Science, having enabled these 
practices, is "evil", and everything scientific is contaminated by this 
evilness.!
But one undeniable advantage of SF, regardless of the negative 
connotations, is that it forces us to reflect upon what hasn’t yet 
happened. More than that just a warning, this has a preventive quality, 
sparking essential debates in anticipation of the problems that can 
create them. Thus, an evil depiction of the consequence does not 
necessarily result in a bad reputation for the praxis. In fact, research 
concludes that, contrary to a common belief and concern among both 
SF advocates and detractors, fictional representations do not 
particularly shape bad perceptions of science itself. For example, Jenny 
Kitzinger’s questioning of what she has coined the “sci-fi alibi” found 
that when people were invited to explain their concerns about stem 
cells research, GM crops and nanotechnology, they would often avoid 
fictional references or just use them metaphorically and instead 
preferred to base their worries on historical precedents such as nuclear 
disasters, Mad Cow or BSE crises, or scandals over weapons of mass 
destruction (Kitzinger 2010: 75). Among other interesting conclusions 
drawn from a previous study by Kitzinger, Henderson and Smart 
(2002), indeed quite positive claims for SF, were that, as opposed to 
news and media, fiction «is more likely to represent people as citizens 
and activists, and to introduce characters with marginalised voices»; 
that it «is more likely to explore ambivalence of opinion» as well as 
emphasizing science’s unpredictability (Kitzinger 2010: 83). !
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Because the realm of the human gene, particularly cloning, strikes 
to the core of human identity both with regards to the individual as 
well as to the species, negotiations between fiction, potential risks, 
uncontrolled science and inhumane consequences of its development 
are of paramount interest in contemporary epistemology. In this article 
I submit that humanity in artificially created beings is particularly 
enhanced by diegesis that include the "evil science" construct; that 
which is abstract and anonymous, often bordering science and fiction 
and acquiring a halo of fantasy due to its intangibility. This depiction of 
science as ungoverned always has to make use of the humanization of 
its "products" to the point where these can't be governed either; when 
they try to control their own destiny. In the case of cloning, as we will 
see, this thematic field has become so much richer in recent years that 
the rearrangement of power within those narrative frameworks that 
seemed standardised, has likewise matured, introducing characters 
whose (post)humanity (Haraway 1991; Hayles 1999) draws our own 
into a new era for our species. This article, therefore, will be devoted to 
analysing contemporary works of fiction dealing with human cloning 
in literary and cinematographic discourses, paying close attention to 
the construction of science as evil and to the new semiotics of the 
human identity they display. With this aim, although other works will 
be cross- referenced, the main corpus will include the novel Never Let 
Me Go (Kazuo Ishiguro, 2005), the motion pictures The Island (Dir. 
Michael Bay, USA, 2005) and Moon (Dir. Duncan Jones, UK, 2009), as 
well as the TV series Orphan Black (created by Graeme Manson & John 
Fawcett, Canada, 2013–). Such an eclectic sampling should provide an 
outline for distinctive typified patterns while allowing room for their 







Image 1. Clones 
being harvested 
in The Island.
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Narrative Considerations on the Clone !
Technology as a tool is rarely a problem. It becomes a problem 
when we can no longer use it as such because it acquires a certain, 
variable degree of autonomy and agency. This is particularly relevant 
in fictions related to the biomedical sciences; those that deal with 
human physiognomy or mind. Although human impersonation as a 
source of identity conflict tends to be accompanied by the misused 
science element, clones and genetically engineered characters 
discursively differ from other human-resembling artificial creations. 
They defy our capability of determining what human means or what a 
person is, even more than replicant/AI/cyborg narratives do. In this 
regard, the clone stands as a perfect discursive and biological exponent 
of the concept of alterity: a clone is an identical individual, one 
hundred percent human, who is nevertheless viewed as a subversion 
of the self. It is precisely the lack of difference here which constitutes 
the maximum threat to the cohesion of identity and ontology. !
When exploring the narrative foundation of the clone we 
inevitably have to consider the abundance of replicas of the self, 
present in literature and cinema. As Hillel Schwartz highlights in The 
Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles (1996), 
our society has always been fascinated by this concept. Two major 
realizations of the human copy can be found in doubles  and clones. 1
Both share many characteristics; the most significant being this quality 
of imitating an original to the extent of becoming physically 
indistinguishable from him or her. In most double narratives -mainly 
folkloric ones - the double is unreal, a ghostly representation of the 
original as a sort of Doppelgänger nonexistent outside the original’s 
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Otto Rank’s study Der Doppelgänger: Eine Psychoalnalystische Studie 
(Vienna/Leipzig/Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1925; 
English translation and edition by Harry Tucker Jr.: The Double: a Psychoa-
nalytic Study. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1971).
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mind; however, others do display a true double representation of their 
referent. In the 1970’s, this inspired some terror and socially critical SF 
like the iconic film The Stepford Wives (Dir. Bryan Forbes, USA, 1975) 
based on the 1972 novel by Ira Levin. Still in these cases, as in clone 
narrative, even if attention is not drawn to the enabling technology, the 
scepticism of an “obscure”, dangerous science, typical of the 
(post)Romantic period and of the second half of the twentieth century, 
is blatant. Both types of narratives also pose the fundamental question 
of identity: where is the boundary between the self and the other. For 
postmodern western culture, obsessed with the concept of subjectivity, 
both the copy and the clone threaten the individual and yet, their 
discursive positioning is quite different.!
In his article "Telling the Difference: Clones, Doubles and What’s 
in Between" (2011/2012) Amit Marcus concludes that while narratives 
of doubles often end in the death of the original, clone narratives 
provide a way to extend life or even gain immortality. The double 
threatens the physical, mental and spiritual survival of the original, 
whereas the clone doesn’t. In spite of one's initial rejection of the figure 
of the clone as an impostor, in most clone narratives there is no tension 
or rivalry between the original and the clone(s): they either don’t co-
exist or are simply unaware of each other’s existence (e.g. Never Let Me 
Go). However, when they do, conflictive dialectics arise, although in 
these scenarios the tension is focused on the figure of the cloner, it 
being a single person, an institution or a corporation. The cloner is the 
"evil science" agent, never performing its duty for the benefit of the 
clone and very rarely for the original.!
!
The Settings: the Evil Science Construct and its 
Agents!
In the Hollywood SF pastiche The Island, biomedical science is 
portrayed as evil in its goal and its means. The clones are subjected to 
unnecessary suffering and cruelty in their deaths and some of the 
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people who work at "the compound", the fake sheltering community in 
which clones are harvested, perform their duties in a rather sadistic 
way. The company also operates secretly and illegally, hiding the truth 
from society and its own clients. Since the entire medical personnel 
collaborate, the evil is not restricted to Dr. Merrick who fully embodies 
all the "mad scientist" stereotypes («I give life! »). The "outcasts", the 
ones who are not scientists or have no scientific knowledge, are the 
morally righteous characters even if they are killers or collaborate with 
the clone factory. The dangerous message that knowledge, particularly 
scientific, equals evilness is made blatant in this film. !
Duncan Jones’ opera prima Moon is a far more exquisite and 
evolved treatment of the theme. In this film, clones are stored and 
progressively awakened to substitute the previous solitary worker at a 
mine on the Moon. The prosthetic memory of the original worker, who 
lives happily on Earth, is implanted into each new clone. This provides 
him with identity and the technical knowledge his original had, thus 
sparing the company time and training expenses running the complex. 
The original does not gain benefit from the harm of cloning; in fact the 
film suggests that he is not even aware of the situation, but he is also a 
victim who has had his identity stolen. The "evil science" shows here its 
full multidisciplinary potential: telecommunications, energy industry, 
cloning, computational neuroscience, etc.: are all devoted to immoral 
behaviour, illegality and abominations. Nevertheless, in the end, 
redemption comes by way of Gerty, the AI unit whose command is to 
«help Sam". The outstanding singularity of Gerty completely breaks 
with all previous AI paradigms; while the embodiment of scientific 
development, "he" displays a much higher degree of humanity than the 
scientists themselves. With its unique approach to clone fiction, this 
masterpiece has undoubtedly become a reference for the subgenre.!
The evilness of the scientific element in Orphan Black, though quite 
conservative in its characterization, is highly problematized by the plot 
itself. To start with, there isn't just one source of evil, since there are 
various enemies on the malevolent side. Secondly, evilness is attributed 
in equal parts to science and to its antitheses. Sarah and her "siblings" 
 7
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone
are chased by several antagonistic groups ranging from religious 
extremism (the pseudo neo-luddite brotherhood of the Proletheans) to 
unscrupulous experimentation (Dyad biotech corporation). Some evil 
characters even agglutinate both extremes simultaneously like the 
“New Age” Prolethean Hank, or the Neolutionist Dr. Leekie. One of 
the “good clones”, Cosima, is not only a highly qualified scientist but 
also «the science» (2x9; my emphasis) as she refers to herself in allusion 
to the study being carried out within her in which she participates 
actively. Finally, the clones’ genetic design seems to have provided 
considerable biological advantages for Sarah’s child, Kira, who 
survives a car accident completely uninjured. Although the clones are 
instrumentalized and suffer the consequences of their “artificial” 
nature, the engineering that has produced them itself is not so 
categorically tainted with evilness. As Sarah wisely clarifies to Cosima, 
she (Sarah) is «worried about scientists more than science» (1x8). 
Science is obscure because it remains mysterious and untameable but it 
is also tantalising thanks to Cosima, Kira and several other “good” 
characters related to science. This duality is represented 
cinematographically too, with the juxtaposition of light and dark in the 
laboratory scenes, musical arrangements and DNA’s double helix used 
as a motif for both the clones and their enemies. !
In Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, exceptionality resides mainly in the 
conformism of the victims, but the contextual assembly also differs 
significantly from any other clone narrative. Science and public 
authorities together have integrated the cloning of humans in order to 
supply for a donations programme that, although never specified in 
the novel, seems to be part of the British health care system making 
society as a whole guilty of the misuse. The novel does not take 
pleasure in biomedical details but, in the end, both cloning and 
transplantation are inevitably perceived as evil practices. Real science 
is completely absent, both in the plausibility of the plot and in its 
textual presence. Instead, a murkier science is suggested: not only is its 
abuse legal and public, but it is also portrayed as unthinking, irrational 
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and, to a certain extent, naïve in its incapacity to foresee the obvious 
ethical conflict into which the practice would lead:!
 [b]y the time they came to consider just how you were 
reared, whether you should have been brought into existence at 
all, well by then it was too late. (…) How can you ask a world that 
has come to regard cancer as curable, how can you ask such a 
world to put away that cure, to go back to the dark 
days?' (Ishiguro 2005: 257)!
One persistent motto in fictions about clones is that the real control 
of science, the top, cutting-edge science is always clandestine; it does 
not serve the state, middle, or low-class civilians. That is one of the 
reasons why Ishiguro’s proposal becomes so unbearable; for that and, 
of course, for the implausible and despairing resilience with which the 
clones face a destiny of agony and death.!
!
Biopolitics, Mercantile Purposes and Identity Crises!
Clones are products of consumption in one way or another and 
this is precisely what raises the debate over their human status, 
otherwise indisputable in biological terms. Whether the purpose of 
their creation and existence is for organ transplantation as in The Island 
and Never Let Me Go, labour force as in Moon, or experimentation as in 
Orphan Black, their bodies –and with them, their literal and holistic 
integrity- are appropriated by others and disposed of at will, which 
poses obvious political considerations. Surprisingly, none of these 
fictions renders the reproductive usage of cloning, allegedly one of the 
most controversial bioethical concerns the practice has traditionally 
aroused. In 1997 Leon Kass objected to this application in his outraged 
“The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of 
Humans” as interfering with what he referred to as the «soul-elevating 
power of sexuality» (Kass 1997: 692). One reproductive drive for 
cloning that has haunted fiction has been that of copying prominent 
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figures to secure their survival, as in Ira Levin’s The Boys from Brazil 
(1976), which nevertheless also objectifies the cloned subject as a 
constituent for a greater plan. Still, the actual perpetuation of the self –
an identical self- in a parental sense does not seem to be as much of a 
desirable fantasy as Kass feared. The originals in The Island cloned 
themselves to have spare components for their own bodies, which is 
quite far from the instinct of progeny. The disturbance that the idea of a 
self clone causes might not only be due to the dangers it can imply in 
terms of identity theft. Our genome holds our biological heritage so its 
control, threatened by this technique, is an innate worry, the engine of 
evolutionary processes. We are vehicles and, to a great extent, as 
Richard Dawkins would claim (1976), subjects of our genes and, to this 
date, cloning doesn’t seem to be a successful procedure to ensure their 
conservation. Perhaps underlying the atavistic rejection to our own 
clone is a survival mechanism for our genes.!
By the end of Orphan Black’s first season a mystery that had been 
haunting Cosima since she'd started analysing her genome, is solved. 
When she finally is able to decipher what looked like a bar code, a text 
unveils that reads «THIS ORGANISM AND DERIVATIVE GENETIC 
MATERIAL IS RESTRICTED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY». 
Encrypted in the clones’ DNA is the copyright of that same genetic 
sequence, leaving no doubt as to the ownership of these women. 
Cosima, astonished by the realization of this new level of their 
commodified existence, reminds Sarah of the implications this might 
also have with regards to her precious and clones-wise unique, 
daughter: «Our bodies, our biology, everything we are, everything we 
become belongs to them. Sarah, they could claim Kira» (1x10). Before 
this, the women had to confront the reality that they were «clones, 
experiments». Now they know that they are not only being serialized, 
but that they are also patented. As subjects, they don't posses 
themselves in any sense, not only because of their duplication, which 
already contradicts the individual, but because the most genuinely 
personal asset of themselves bears a legal bond to somebody else; they 
are property.!
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It's interesting to note here how the copyright, one of the fiercest 
emblems of capitalism, refers to the property itself almost 
euphemistically -while maintaining its legal accuracy- as an "organism" 
depriving it of any human recognition. Also worth noting is the 
extension of that ownership towards future offspring, derogatorily 
referred to as “derivative material", a far more nefarious sense of 
ownership. Since the original genome is synthetic, it is treated as 
intellectual property. The allusion here to Foucault’s concept of 
biopower (1977-1978) seems inevitable, with the aforementioned 
commercial binding standing out as a particularly perverse and literal 
mechanism « [t]hrough which the basic biological features of the 
human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general 
strategy of power» (Foucault 1977-1978: 1).!
Never Let Me Go does not show more indulgence with the clones. 
As school children they are already told about their future prospect by 
one of their teachers, who can no longer stand the students' fantasies of 
adult freewill:!
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Your lives are set out for you. You’ll become adults, then 
before you’re old, before you’re even middle-aged, you’ll start to 
donate your vital organs. That’s what each of you was created to do. 
(...) You were brought into this world for a purpose, and your 
futures, all of them, have been decided. (Ishiguro 2005: 80, my 
emphasis)!
This unofficial pronouncement stems from the profound 
discomfort all the other humans in the novel experiment when 
witnessing the clash between the very humane hopes of the clones 
with their inhumane fate and purpose. Thus, the non-human quality 
serves once again to energise an ontological problem as, a priori, 
humanity is taken for granted in those who show their lack of it and 
vice versa. Gabriele Griffin commented on the effect of the clones' 
acceptance of their fate and the lack of redemption in the novel as 
calling for «[t]he ‘innocent bystander’ position, the observer function 
that has so haunted twentieth-century critiques of human relations at 
intimate and global levels» (Griffin 2009: 658). This ‘innocent 
bystander’ position may indeed haunt the reading of Never Let Me Go, 
but the spectators' experience when witnessing clones on screen, 
regardless of their instrumentalization by fellow humans and their 
own reaction to it, implies a much more specific positioning to the 
(sub)genre. We are alien to this in Ishiguro's fiction because, in its 
narrative rareness, we never get to meet any other copies of the 
characters we are introduced to. We know they are clones but we don't 
have the originals or other reproductions. The representation and 
discourse of the clones through visual text usually differs considerably 
in this regard, since they strongly engage in the multiplicity of the 
character(s), something which, according to anthropologist Debora 
Battaglia, poses «[a] problem of identification for the grammar of the 
film» (Battaglia 2001: 511). Leaning on L. Mulvey's (1975) spectatorship 
theory of identification with the hero, Battaglia highlights that 
«Because heroes here are multiple, not the autonomous egos of 
Freudian theory, we are with the owner and the owned at once, if we 
are with anyone; our subject-position identifies with a relation» (ibid.). 
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This relation is further complicated if the original from which the clone 
has been copied takes part in the equation. In The Island, for instance 
this spectatorship placement and the anti-science message are so 
heavily stereotyped that identification with the hero and heroine does 
not allow for the coexistence of original and clone; since clones are the 
main characters towards whom all our empathy must be projected, 
originals are -whether evil or not- condemned to death: Lincoln's 
sponsor, Tom, gets killed and Jordan’s is left to die without the 
required transplantation. !
!
The search for “the original” is a common drive in most clone 
narratives. But in addition to the search for paternal figures in the 
maker that all artificially created beings go through - e.g. the "creature" 
in Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (Mary Shelley, 1818) or the 
replicants in Blade Runner (Dir. Ridley Scott, USA, 1982)-, we must add 
the desperate search for the original self, the ultimate vessel of identity. 
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Obviously, as bystanders –using Griffin’s terminology- the less we get to 
know about the originals, the better our identification with the clone 
will be and the fewer his or her chances are of losing the heroic trait for 
the spectator. Getting to know the original is a different aim from that 
of learning the reasons why they were created. In some cases, as in 
Never Let Me Go, this goal is presented as potentially enabling to 
explain their existential profile. Unfortunately for Ishiguro’s clones, 
more than a source of answers the figure of the original ends up being 
perceived almost like a chimera, having inspired all sorts of 
speculation and hypothesis within the group of friends who never get 
to know who they have been cloned from. Griffin notes here that the 
clones’ obsessive search for their biological origin in Never Let Me Go, 
«[h]umanizes them, rendering them a companion species, in Donna 
Haraway’s terms, rather than an other on a different, hierarchized 
scale» (Griffin 2009: 657). Of course the quest for the original 
presupposes knowledge of its existence and therefore, self-awareness 
of being a clone. Another frequent obsession in these fictions, 
whenever two or more copies confront each other, is determining who 
the original is. The first reaction to an identical copy of oneself is that of 
incredulity and rejection. In Moon, Sam2 and Sam3 engage in a heated 
argument soon after meeting each other, each claiming to be the 
original («I am Sam Bell! »). Admitting that the other is the original 
would imply that the self is a copy. To their great despair all the Sams 
finally learn the truth and have to resign to the fact that they all are just 
that, clones.                      !
Image 4. Sams playing ping pong in Moon.!
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The Several Within One: Human Personhood and its 
“Holy” Attributes!
Because identity can only be defined in terms of opposition, 
through difference, clone characters by lacking that input when facing 
fellow clones, are condemned to an endless identity crisis. Acceptance 
of this similarity develops powerful bonds between the subjects who 
then take advantage of the knowledge about the other through the self. 
This interesting alliance opens then an entire array of family-related 
emotional practices, for once the barrier of rejection has been crossed, 
understanding and reliance on one another naturalise the clone relation 
as a perfectly normative fraternal one. After all, as Dawkins once 
stated, «clones are simply identical twins» . Although both Moon and 2
Orphan Black portray this same progress among the clones sooner or 
later after the realization of the others’ existence, the manner between 
them differs widely due to the fact that, unlike Orphan Blacks’, clones in 
Moon share the same prosthetic memory and, therefore, the same mind. 
The nature vs nurture distinction thus produces very different types of 
clone characters too: those who have been raised in totally different 
environments (Orphan Black) and those who share not only the same 
genome but also the exact same history (Moon). In the TV series, this 
disparity confronts Sarah with what at first is her total nemesis, 
Helena, ironically her true mirror twin sister, who eventually becomes 
part of “the clone club”. The behavioural footprint is highly 
emphasized in the show providing the audience with "products" of 
different upbringing: the street-smart, passionate Sarah, the orderly but 
mentally unstable Alison, the self-assured, socially detached Rachel, 
the pragmatic Cosima and the disturbed Helena, amongst others. The 
range of identity features thus allows room for conservatism, 
homosexuality –sexual taste and performance indeed plays a key role 
in depicting the women’s personalities-, religious fanaticism and utter 
scientificness within the same identical genome. !
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The characters’ heterogeneity, masterly portrayed by Tatiana 
Maslany’s acting in Orphan Black, also constitutes yet another inspiring 
analytical layer in Moon’s proposal. Although in this case the clones are 
serialized bodies of the same age, kept in suspended animation, the 
time lapse between their awakening and the present action 
dramatically determines their character as well as their physical and 
mental health. This setting serves as a perfect context to explore that 
natural multiplicity of the self: the different selves, -tendencies, moods, 
etc. - one bears within translate very adequately to a set of clones with 
the same personal background. This phenomenon also offers the most 
comical instances in the film, through their perception of one another, 
recognised as a self, and the opportunity this provides for self-
knowledge:!
«He’s got a problem. He scares me, Gerty»!
«What is it about Sam that scares you? »!
«He flies off the handle. I see it now. I see what Tess was 
talking about»!
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In the dialogue above, one of the Sams is sharing with Gerty his 
concern about the other Sam’s aggressiveness. In seeing his clone’s 
behaviour he now identifies with the claims his wife would make to 
him. This mechanism functions in the opposite direction too, as each 
clone is certain of, for example, the other’s moral values in spite of 
having just met: «You can’t kill anybody. You can’t. I know you can’t 
because I can’t».!
In spite of their complex and troubled identities, clones’ 
categorization as human, as we have mentioned, is often put into 
question. At times that category depends upon the labelling the 
“human” characters in the story may choose; in Never Let Me Go, for 
instance, clones are never allowed full humanity: « [p]eople did their 
best not to think about you. And if they did, they tried to convince 
themselves you weren’t really like us. That you were less than human, so 
it didn’t matter» (Ishiguro 2005: 258, my emphasis). To be labelled “less 
than human” implies the possession of certain humanness, yet, 
insufficient to enjoy the privileges “human” denotes. Although a tacit 
controversy always underlies the human category, because the biology 
is human, reference to this nature is often avoided in clone narratives 
in favour of a sort of metonymic relation with that of person. Since the 
scope of their identities can never be constrained, these remain open 
and undetermined. Because they are copies, what is questioned is their 
subjectivity. !
While subjectivity is indeed denied in the copy, such impediment 
clashes with the hero/heroine constituency itself. If, as Battaglia 
argues, we identify with a relationship not with a subject, it seems 
improbable that we could experience any empathy with a clone 
character. Yet their discursive construction, at least in the works we are 
discussing here, seems indisputably personified. Clone characters draw 
the audience into a three- stage process of identification: they first have 
to be textually recognised as human –or almost human-, then their 
artificiality has to be stressed and finally, from that objectified position 
they reclaim their personhood thus gaining subjectivity. Battaglia 
extends the main turn-of-the century anthropological concerns to 
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science culture, as recognizing « [h]uman personhood and 
“technologies of the self” as social from the start» (Battaglia 2001: 495). 
This acknowledgement helps to understand Moon’s complex case. In 
spite of the fact that all the Sams share one personal memory and 
therefore lack the socialization that could provide them with the 
aforementioned personhood, the moment they begin to interact with one 
another they automatically position themselves as subjects, regardless 
of the artificiality of their previous self. Furthermore, interaction with 
Gerty already allows a socializing network that can enable their 
subjectivity. In this regard, Gerty’s own progressive ascription to a 
subject paradigm is worth noting because, even if on a different level, it 
runs parallel to that of the clones. When finalising the plan for escaping 
from the lunar station, Sam can’t help to correct his robotic friend when 
“it” mentions the next clone’s programming: «We’re not programmed; 
we’re people». In this utterance, subjectivity is emphasised over the 
dissolution of identity that cloning theoretically implies. The use of the 
pronoun “we” here, however, renders an interesting ambiguity: it 
could refer to all the Sams but, by the deliberate avoidance of the 
adjective “human” it could also be including Gerty within the category. 
This choice of “people” as Robin Stoate notes, « [i]s much more 
inclusive a term than ‘human’, and is in the spirit of companionship 
that Haraway’s thinking requires» (Stoate 2012: 209). !
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The lyrical indicator of humanity or, more appropriately, human 
personhood par excellence is the soul. Although in principle the concept 
of soul should be separated from the scientific dialectics, allusion to it 
is recurrent in biomedical fictions. Interestingly, among all the 
acceptations the word has had throughout history –originally 
designating the quality of animated beings- the most reductive, Semitic 
one prevails in these narratives, often raised by the scientists 
themselves, as something exclusive to and distinctive of the human. In 
the orthodox “mad scientist” sermon with which The Island’s Dr Merril 
replies to the mercenary’s accusation of killing of the clones for 
business, the doctor clarifies that they are «[s]imply tools, instruments; 
they have no souls». Because they have no souls their killing does not 
terminate with anything animated. “Agnates” (the clones) can barely be 
considered to possess the qualities required to be alive as opposed to 
he, who, in evident contrast, is capable of even giving life. A similar use 
of the soul as a human person referent is made in Never Let Me Go, 
where clones' artistic expression is intended to raise public awareness 
of their spirituality, as Miss Emily eventually confesses to Katherine: 
«‘We took away your art because we thought it could reveal your 
souls. Or, to put it more finely, to prove that you had souls at 
all’» (Ishiguro 2005: 255). In Orphan Black, Tomas asserts that 
“abominations have no souls” (2x2) whereas his fellow Prolethean 
Hank, sees clone Helena as a blessed creature from God.!
The protagonism of the soul in clone narratives, nevertheless, 
might not only obey the characteristic personhood vindication of 
artificially created beings. In this case, as intangible as the concept of 
soul might be, the connection with humanity is much more empiric 
from a purely taxonomic perspective. Clone and genetic engineering 
fictions tend to suggest that there is something spiritual about our 
genome. A very human characteristic of our genes, that which must 
distinguish us, not from other animals – a segregation understood to be 
made in mere evolutionary terms- but from machines or the artificial, is 
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to include imperfection. This is a message conveyed in all narratives 
dealing with eugenics and inferred in those that specifically involve 
cloning too, for the process rarely goes without some genetic 
amendment. It seems trying to improve our genome can only lead to 
disastrous social and biological consequences for the species. The 
natural, original, DNA is to be preserved and treasured as it is. As 
David A. Kirby states in reference to cinema dealing with eugenics 
themes, «[b]ecause these films attribute spiritual significance to the 
human genome as well as position it as the locus of personal identity, 
they condemn any belief that our genome should be modified» (Kirby 
2007: 84). The same science that profanes the "holy" gene by altering it 
is the one to garnish it with such a numinous aura concurrently 
exposing the paradox of the scientist-god. The genome is the essence of 




The fears embedded in the prospect of human cloning may indeed 
project the ancestral survival programming of our own genes. Clone 
fiction accepts the possibility of serializing humans, of producing the 
same individual ad infinitum, but individuality requires uniqueness, a 
clashing feature that has always stood as the basis of our subjectivity. 
In its attempt to govern human nature, cloning cuts to the core of our 
unpredictability through massive the reproduction of the self. The only 
means to undertake such control being scientific, their characterization 
plays a crucial role in articulating (post)humanity through fiction. The 
agents and technologies holding this power have traditionally been 
portrayed as pernicious to humankind because they endanger its 
purity, and evil, because they desecrate the gene. Although the 
positioning of science within its fault or misuse is not as dichotomised 
in recent narratives, the sacredness attributed to the genome remains. 
In Orphan Black both Sarah and her twin Helena are able to bear 
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children in spite of having been designed not to. The Prolethean leader 
perceives this as “a miracle” (2x9) because it exposes the irrepressible 
power of human nature as a divine design, which strives to make its 
way through scientific constraints. To Kass’s delight, sexual 
reproduction wins over both processes of cloning and genetic 
manipulation.!
The main focus of clone narrative -shared by any concerning 
artificially created beings- resides, nevertheless, in the objectification of 
the subject. Gabriele Griffin (2009) has noted that these fictions also 
shift the controversy over how humans might be conceived -the 
biotechnological-, to how humans might be raised and treated -the 
social-. Undoubtedly, this is one valuable asset of the works here 
analysed, but clone narratives engage us in a far more intricate 
reflection upon ourselves which encompasses many more layers. As 
happens in narratives about doubles, with clone fiction we are forced 
to reconsider the traditional assumption of identity as something 
unified and coherent. Whilst the double might interfere with this unity, 
the clone simply exposes its fragility by confronting the individual 
with the other in the same space. Thus, in a way, the figure of the clone 
dissolves the concept of alterity by proposing alternative models of 
individuality. The underlying semiotic value of the clone for examining 
human subjectivity is further reinforced on the screen. As an additional 
layer of complexity, the standard duplicity of the self when put into 
image, multiplies in clone discourse where the self can be endlessly 
reproduced. Contemporary narratives expand the process of 
identification to a new level of sympathy for these characters. The 
clone projects our conflicts with our cyborgization (Hables 2011) in 
progress, with the technologically dominated self and with our 
fledgling posthuman identity, while enhancing the serendipity of our 
nature: one which transcends biological and environmental 
constructions and allows subjectivity beyond singularity.  !
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